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Abstract:  We explore the indirect network effect in the market for home video games. 
We examine the video game console makers’ strategic choice between increasing 
demand by lowering console price and by encouraging the growth of software variety.  
We also explore the existence of an applications barrier to entry in the console market, 
and find that there is little evidence for such a barrier.  Finally, we assess the applicability 
of the model to out-of-sample situations, to look at whether our model and previous 
similar models can generalize to other markets for purposes of marketing or antitrust 
inquiry.  We find that the model generalizes reasonably well to the Japanese market for 
the same generation of gaming systems, but poorly to previous generations in the US 
market.   
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1. Introduction  
Modern high tech firms compete by leveraging economies of scale.  To stimulate 
demand and achieve economies of scale, such firms take advantage of indirect network 
effects, whereby the consumer valuation of the primary product increases with the size of 
a complementary good market.  In our application, the primary product is the video game 
console—GameCube, PlayStation2, or XBOX—and the complementary good is gaming 
software.  We empirically explore the indirect network effect in the market for sixth 
generation home video games.   
The economic issues we investigate are threefold:  examination of the video game 
console makers’ strategic choice between increasing demand by lowering console price 
and by encouraging the growth of software variety, exploration into the importance of 
applications barriers to entry, and assessment of the applicability of previous econometric 
studies to new situations.  We begin by empirically estimate the size of the network effect 
and how firms may use it to achieve economies of scale.  We examine the firm’s choice 
between increasing demand by lowering console price and by encouraging the growth of 
software variety.  This part of the study gives us a better understanding of firms’ business 
strategies in markets for high tech consumer goods.  We follow in the tradition of recent 
papers in this area (Nair, et al., 2004; Clements and Ohashi, 2005), and thus complements 
the growing literature on the empirical measurement of indirect network effects.   
 The second economic issue involves questions of public policy in network 
markets.  After estimating our structural econometric models, our detailed price and game 
variety data allow us to explore the impact of a console maker’s ability to negotiate the 
creation of games that cannot be played on its competitors’ platforms.  Can the console 
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maker’s negotiating power, in conjunction with the indirect network effects from the 
video games, create an applications barrier to entry in the console market?  Because 
empirical assessment of applications barriers to entry are rare, our results here—
essentially negative—are of particular interest for antitrust economics. 
Finally, we investigate the applicability of such econometric studies to new 
situations.  There is a growing set of empirical studies of markets with indirect network 
effects.  Are these case studies valuable for providing general insight into network mar-
kets, or do their conclusions have little predictive power for new markets?  The extant 
literature gives no indication at all on the extent to which results from case studies apply 
to new situations, which is important in the arenas of marketing and antitrust.  We 
undertake a meta-inquiry into the generalizability of results gleaned from such studies.  
To approach this issue we take advantage of the fact that our data come from the next 
generation of video games produced after the consoles studied in Clements and Ohashi 
(2005).  We are thus able to see how useful their results, estimated from previous 
hardware generations, are toward explaining consumer demand and the size of the 
network effect in the out-of-sample (but closely related) sixth generation video game 
market.  We also explore how well our model, estimated with US data, would do in out-
of-market extrapolation to the Japanese market. 
We find significant effects of both price and software variety on console demand.  
Indirect network effects are present, but the ability to which software can substitute for 
lower prices is modest:  a one percent increase in software variety is equivalent to a 0.39 
percent price reduction.  We also find evidence that software is perishable, in the sense 
that the existence of older titles does not affect hardware demand as do newer titles.  
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Furthermore, we find that there is little evidence for the existence of an applications 
barrier to entry in the console market.  Firms appear to have little power to build or 
maintain market share through developing large stocks of games for their systems.  
Finally, when we compare our results to out-of-sample situations, to look at whether our 
(and similar) models can generalize to other markets, we find that the model generalizes 
reasonably well to the Japanese market for the same generation of gaming systems, but 
poorly to previous generations in the US market.  Similarly, models estimated by others 
for previous generation markets do not extrapolate well to our market data.  These latter 
results provide a cautionary note on the applicability of structural models of indirect 
network effects to new markets and data. 
In the rest of this section we mention the literature we build upon and how our 
study differs.   Empirical studies of markets in which indirect network effects are 
introduced through a complementary good include Gandal, Kende, and Rob (2000), 
Dranove and Gandal (2003), Nair, et al. (2004), and Clements and Ohashi (2005).  These 
studies build upon an earlier empirical literature on direct network effects in such markets 
as fax machines (Economides and Himmelberg, 1995) and spreadsheets (Gandal, 1994).  
We follow the New Empirical IO program and adopt a structural empirical model 
developed by Nair, et al. (2004), who derive it from a theoretical model of consumer 
preferences for hardware and software and competitive provision of software.  The 
indirect network effect is then identified from the interaction of the hardware and 
software markets.  Two equations are estimated, one for console market share and 
another for software variety.  
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Our choice of industry and econometric model are similar to that of Clements and 
Ohashi (2005).  However, we investigate different issues, focusing less on the evolution 
of the product life cycle than the potential for applications barriers to entry and the 
generalizability of the results.  We also explore in the hardware demand estimation 
whether games become entirely “played out” after a few months, and find that they do.     
We describe the home video game market in the next section.  In section 3 we 
present the theoretical and empirical models of indirect network effects.  We present and 
discuss our data in section 4, and the estimations in section 5.  In section 6, we explore 
the potential for an applications barrier to entry.  In the following section, we compare 
our results to previous studies and explore the out-of-sample predictive power of the 
model. 
2. The Market for Sixth Generation Home Video 
Games 
Video games play a large role in the American entertainment market. In the US, 
75% of household heads play computer or video games, and the average gamer spends 
more than triple the amount of time playing video games each week than time spent in 
exercise, reading, and community, religious, and creative activities combined.1  In 2004, 
US households purchased software for two video games on average, and the total sales of 
consoles, portable devices, and software in the video game industry is nearly $10 billion, 
greater than that of Hollywood’s box office. 
In Figure 1, we depict a simplified market structure showing the interaction 
between agents involved in the video game industry. A video game system is a 
                                                 
1 Entertainment Software Association, “Essential facts about the computer and video game industry,” May, 
18, 2005. 
5 
combination of hardware and software, each with separate producers. We focus on the 
sixth generation 128-bit2 video game system, which includes PlayStation2 (Sony), XBOX 
(Microsoft), GameCube (Nintendo) and Dreamcast (Sega). Since Sega dropped out of the 
market in 2000 and was never a major player, we do not include Dreamcast in the 
analysis. 
As shown in Table 1, PlayStation2 entered the US market first, in October 2000, 
while XBOX and GameCube appeared simultaneously in the US market one year later.  
Entering later allowed Microsoft to introduce a console with the best hardware quality, 
evaluated in terms of the speed of the graphics processing unit (GPU), central processing 
unit (CPU), and memory (RAM).  Except for memory size, GameCube also has better 
hardware quality than PlayStation2.  Even with higher hardware quality, XBOX and 
GameCube did not set higher prices than PlayStation2.  Table 1 shows that Microsoft 
priced its XBOX similarly to PlayStation2, while Nintendo set GameCube’s price well 
below the other two.  
The great advantage enjoyed by PlayStation2 is its large amount of available 
software. During our data period (March 2002-Dec 2004), PlayStation2 started with the 
most software and maintained its lead by providing almost half of the new software 
available in the market. PlayStation2’s leading position in software provision strengthens 
hardware sales, due to the complementary nature of hardware and software, and helps to 
explain why PlayStation2 is the best-selling console in the market given its higher price 
and poorer hardware quality. Figure 2 (monthly sales) shows that within our data period 
                                                 
2 Console generations are distinguished by the instruction word length of the CPU, which indicates the 
maximum complexity of any single command sent to the processor.  In 1977, Atari introduced the 2600, a 
4-bit video game system that was the first generation of home gaming systems.  
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PlayStation2 has the highest console sales each month, except for the occasional banner 
month by XBOX. 
Different brands of hardware are not compatible with each other3—software 
designed for one brand cannot be played on another.  As a result, when a consumer buys 
a console, he can enjoy the machine only by purchasing the software designed for that 
specific console. Because of the mutual incompatibility among consoles, buying a 
console and consequently purchasing games is akin to choosing a platform to trade with 
software providers. Due to this two sided market feature, there are two sources of revenue 
for console producers: revenue from consumers by selling hardware and revenue from 
game publishers by charging license fees and royalties to game developers.  
To attract consumers, console producers advertise in the media and exhibit at 
trade shows at great expense.  Microsoft spent an industry-record $500 million in 18 
months for the marketing of XBOX, attempting to catch up to PlayStation2 (Schilling, 
2003).  The tremendous effort expended chasing console sales is not for the purpose of 
profiting from the hardware.  There is evidence that at least Microsoft and Sony set 
console prices below marginal cost.4  Instead, console makers hope to earn their profit 
from the sales of gaming software.  Low console prices play a dual role for hardware 
manufacturers.  Through low prices, console manufacturers increase their installed base, 
which due to the indirect network effects increases sales of profitable software.  Low 
prices may also be a response to a potential holdup problem: if after buying the console a 
                                                 
3 The exception is the backward compatibility of different generation of hardware produced by the same 
manufacturer. For example, the software for PlayStation (5th generation) can be played in PlayStation 2, 
and XBOX games can be played on XBOX 360 (7th generation) with a peripheral.  
4 A Merrill Lynch report, reported in D. Becket and J. Wilcox, "Will Xbox Drain Microsoft?" CNET 
News.com, 2001, estimates that XBOX would cost Microsoft $375 per unit.  This appears to be the 
marginal cost of the hardware only, and does not include sales, marketing, or development costs.  The price 
at launch for XBOX was $299.  The article also cites an IDC analyst who claims Microsoft’s per-unit loss 
on XBOX is comparable to Sony’s loss on PlayStation2. 
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consumer could be exploited to pay high prices for software, forward-looking consumers 
would be willing to pay lower prices for hardware.  
The business model of the gaming industry—consoles as loss leaders for 
software—makes it crucial for hardware manufacturers to maintain good relationship 
with game publishers to ensure they create appealing games. In Table 2 we present the 
information of software provision.  Independent software publishers produce the most 
software (92% of the total), with a far smaller amount created by the console 
manufacturers.  A software publisher may produce its games in-house or contract out to 
independent developers.5  Even when games are produced by independent developers, 
due to royalty agreements the console maker profits directly from game sales.  The 
average cost of developing a 128-bit game is about $6 million,6 which includes licensing 
fees paid to content providers.7   
A game publisher will consider a console’s current and expected installed base 
when deciding for which platform to write a game.  Negotiations over license fees and 
royalties hinge on the game’s potential popularity (about which much may be known 
[e.g., yearly editions of the popular Madden NFL sports game]) and whether it is 
provided exclusively for the console.  In Table 2 we also show the proportion of software 
that is provided exclusively, which is one measure of product differentiation among 
systems. PlayStation2 has the greatest proportion of exclusive software, showing its 
bargaining strength with software publishers and developers. Software publishers 
undertake their own marketing as well through advertising and trade show participation.  
                                                 
5 The main independent publishers are: EA, Ubisoft, VUGames, THQ, Sega, Namco, Midway, Konami, 
Acclaim, Atari, and Activision. 
6 Southwest Securities, Interactive Entertainment Software: Industry Report, Fall, 2000. 
7 For example, publishers of NBA basketball games have to pay license fees to the NBA. 
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Costs are certain but rewards are not:  only a small portion of games are profitable.8  The 
distribution of returns is highly skewed: a mega-hit such as Grand Theft Auto – San 
Andreas has a return more than 40 times of the average development cost. 
 
3. Modeling Indirect Network Effects 
3.1 Hardware Adoption 
Our focus is on the hardware adoption and software provision of a hardware-
software system.  The techniques we intend to use are now well established in the 
empirical literature on indirect network effects, and we therefore present them here in 
abbreviated form.  Our empirical models are derived from a theoretical model of 
consumer utility for hardware and software and competitive, free entry supply of 
software.  The hardware supply side is left unspecified.  The theoretical model is derived 
by Chou and Shy (1990) and Church and Gandal (1992, 1993), and extended by Nair, et 
al. (2004).   
Consumers maximize utility in a static framework through the choice of a video 
game console and software.  Utility comes from hardware attributes and from 
complementary software.  Consumers choose among J + 1 alternative systems in the 
market, including the outside option of purchasing no system.  Utility is additively 
separable in hardware and software.  Utility from software is in CES form (à la Dixit and 
Stiglitz, 1977), which leads to a closed form expression for demand for software titles (of 
which there are Njt for system j in month t) as a function of software prices.  Specifying 
CES utility implies that each consumer values all (compatible) software equally.9    
                                                 
8 In the late 1990 only 10% of software released can turn into profit (Coughlan, 2004). 
9 Refer to Clements and Ohashi (2005) for discussion of this simplifying assumption. 
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To derive an estimating equation for console demand, we begin with utility for 
consumer i for gaming system j in month t: 
 Ujti = β0 + βppjt  + βxxj + δNjt + ξjt + εjt (1) 
where pjt is the hardware price of system j and jx  represents hardware attributes.  
Hardware attributes are characteristics such as the instruction word length of the CPU 
(e.g. 128 bit), the speed of the CPU and the Graphics Processing Unit (GPU), and the 
amount of RAM.  Thus βxxj reflects the average benefit derived from hardware quality. 
The term jtNδ  is the indirect network effect derived from the theoretical model for 
software demand.  The static formulation of the model restricts consumers to making 
decisions in month t based only on software currently available, not anticipated future 
stocks of software.   
In moving from the theoretical model to the empirical model, in this version of 
the paper we simplify estimation by restricting Njt to enter (1) in linear (or quadratic, in 
some specifications) form.10  The term ξjt  captures the deviation of average hardware 
quality of console j known to the consumers but not the econometrician, and we assume 
that (conditional on exogenous observables) E(ξjt) = 0. The variable ξjt incorporates all 
variables pertaining to consumer perceptions about the hardware brand not elsewhere 
included in the data, such as advertising, the “word on the street”, etc.  To control for 
various time varying effects on demand, we also include holiday dummies and year 
dummies, and their interactions with brand dummies.  When brand (console) dummies 
are included, βx is not estimable, because jx does not change over time within our sixth-
                                                 
10 The theory implies that Njt enters as a power function with coefficient between 0 and 1.  Clements and 
Ohashi (2005) find that when they allow more flexible functional forms for Njt  they cannot reject a linear 
relationship. 
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generation data.  Furthermore, when we include console effects, ξjt is then interpreted as 
deviations over time (net of the average tastes for console j) in consumer tastes for the 
console brand.  Allowing ξjt to vary over time reflects the non-constant nature of 
advertising and evolving consumer perceptions of the brand. 
Assuming jtε follows a nested logit distribution leads to the familiar nested logit 
model. The decision tree for the consumers has two levels.  In the first stage, consumers 
decide whether to buy any console at all.  If households decide to buy, they next choose 
which brand of console to buy. This model leads to an intuitive substitution pattern: when 
a household switches away from a console it is more likely switch to another console 
than to not buying.  This decision tree leads to the following nested logit estimating 
equation: 
 ln(sjt) – ln(s0t) = cj + dt + βppjt  + βxxj + δNjt + σ ln(sjt|g) + ξjt (2) 
where jts represents the market share of hardware j in month t, and 0ts is the market share 
of outside alternatives.  In (2), we explicitly include the brand dummies cj and the holiday 
and year dummies dt.  To avoid possible confusion, note that the time dummies dt do not 
amount to a full set of period (monthly) dummies; with our brand-month data this is not 
possible.  Rather than assuming that each household purchases anew each period, we 
remove the household from the market base in future periods if it has already purchased a 
system, tantamount to assuming that each household buys one console only.  We relax 
this assumption when we check the robustness of our empirical results.  The term sjt|g 
represents the within-group market share of console j (defined as sjt/(1 – s0t)); its 
coefficient σ  represents the correlation between consumer choices within the nest, and 
thus is bounded between zero and one.  Higher values of σ  reflect a greater likelihood 
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that a consumer switching away from one gaming console will choose another system 
rather than none at all (the outside good, which is the single element of the other nest).  In 
our empirical work, we found that the nested logit model did not provide a good fit for 
the hardware demand data, and so the estimates we discuss most come from a simpler 
logit model, which is identical to (2) with σ = 0.  We estimate the model via an efficient 
version of linear instrumental variables (IV), a procedure suggested by Berry (1994) that 
is commonly used in discrete choice demand estimation using aggregate data.  Rather 
than using traditional two-stage least squares, we use a GMM procedure that is efficient 
in the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.11  Autocorrelation can arise in 
the model from the interpretation of the error term as incorporating consumers attitudes 
about brands.  While these may change month to month, it is likely that there will be 
persistence due to the effects of advertising campaigns and the like.  Autocorrelation in 
the errors is not ignorable in this model (i.e., it does not affect merely the efficiency of 
the estimates) because it gives rise to an endogeneity problem, described in section 4. 
3.2 Software Supply 
On the software supply side, there are many potential firms, each of which can 
produce one software title for one platform.  Marginal cost is constant and fixed costs are 
present, ensuring a well-defined free-entry equilibrium with symmetric prices (the latter 
ensured by the CES demand for software).  The equilibrium number of software titles, Njt, 
is derived from the theoretical model.  Given the assumptions, log Nj is affine in the log 
                                                 
11 In particular, we use the ivreg2 add-on command for Stata with the “gmm robust bw(2)” option. 
This estimates the two-step efficient GMM estimator, where the covariance matrix used for estimation and 
standard errors is robust to both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  The Bartlett kernel (with 
bandwidth set to one lag) is used to estimate the autocorrelation.  For the joint estimations, we cannot use 
ivreg2 and instead use the gmm command in TSP, with similar options chosen. 
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of console installed base, Yjt, which leads to a simple form for econometric estimation.  
The estimating equation for software supply is: 
 ln(Njt) = αj + dt + γ ln (Yjt) + ηjt (3) 
where αj is a brand fixed effect, Yjt is the installed base of system j up to time t−1, and 
jtη is a mean zero error term.  Because the brand effect could change over time, we 
control for year dummies, holiday dummies, and their interactions (dt).12 
Equation (3) for software supply is the second estimating equation.  Equations (2) 
and (3) may be estimated consistently by themselves, or jointly for more efficient 
estimation.  We do both below. 
It is important to note that we do not estimate a fully dynamic structural model 
here.  In particular, the software supply decision is made anew each period, based on the 
current installed base of systems, without taking into account the role of expected future 
console sales (except through the console-level and console-year fixed effects). Similarly, 
hardware demand is based only on the current stock of software available, without 
explicitly accounting for expected future software variety.  Again, some of these 
expectations no doubt contribute to the console-level and console-year fixed effects in the 
demand estimation. 
4. Data and Endogeneity Issues 
4.1 Data 
The data we analyze is for the sixth-generation home video game market, 
including consoles PlayStation2 (Sony), XBOX (Microsoft) and GameCube (Nintendo).  
The potential market size for hardware is calculated as the total number of households 
                                                 
12 Again, note that dt do not take different values every month.   
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with at least one television, which is found in the Census Bureau’s 2004-2005 Statistical 
Abstract of the United States (2002 vintage data).  The monthly console sales data are 
from NPD Fun Group, acquired from gaming news site PCvsConsole.com.  The console 
sales data, along with the calculated market size, allows us to create all market share 
variables from March 2002 to December 2004 (34 months). The start of the sample 
period is chosen to accord with XBOX’s entrance into the Japanese market, since we use 
Japanese market data as instruments below. The end of the period is chosen to minimize 
the possible impact on demand due to the anticipated introduction of next generation 
systems (specifically, XBOX360).  XBOX360 entered the market November 2005, and 
the press heralded its advent as early as Microsoft’s official announcement in May 2005.  
Since we do not model forward-looking behavior in our static model, we end our sample 
period well before XBOX360 was announced.  Summary statistics on the data are in 
Table 3. 
We collected monthly hardware price data (average of weekly prices) from the 
websites of seven major retail chains, including CompUSA, Electronics Boutique, Target, 
Game Stop, Fry’s Electronic, Toys 'R' Us and KB Toy Works.  Prices are adjusted by the 
consumer price index.13  Console characteristics are from manufacturer’s websites. 
The game title data for software is from Gamespot.com, which maintains a 
complete list of games published for PS2, XBOX and GameCube.14  These data show the 
publisher’s identity, date of issue, and for which consoles the game is available.  When 
constructing the software variety variable jtN from these data, we assume the software is 
to some degree “perishable” to consumers.  Instead of adopting the commonly used 
                                                 
13 CPI: All urban consumers, all items. 
14 Unlike Clements and Ohashi (2005), we do not have sales data for software. 
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measure of total software variety, accumulated since the introduction of the console, we 
assume that potential consumers care more about recent titles. Thus, we split software 
into two categories: new titles issued in the current and previous three months, and the 
rest of the accumulated (older) titles.  This treatment for accumulated software is suggest 
by evidence that often the life cycle of a video game title is brief, often with more than 
50% (and sometimes as much as 80%) of sales typically occurring during the first three 
months after its release (Coughlan, 2001, 2004).  A longer-run reason for software 
perishability is that the most popular titles are regularly updated (e.g., Halo vs. Halo2; 
NFL 2003 vs. NFL2004), which reduces demand for older versions.   
For the holiday dummies, we allow console demand and software supply to differ 
during peak game purchasing times:  June for the start of summer vacation, and 
November/December for the year-end holiday season. 
4.2 Endogeneity and Instruments 
In the rest of this section we address the potential for endogeneity of several of 
the variables appearing on the right side of the hardware adoption and software provision 
estimating equations, and discuss our solutions.   
Endogeneity in the Hardware Adoption Equation 
In the hardware adoption model, the variables we suspect may be correlated with 
the error term in (2) are observed hardware characteristics, within group share, console 
price, and software variety.  The unobserved hardware attributes, jtξ , could be generated 
from the impact of promotional activity, brand image, or other unobserved systematic 
shocks to demand.  Such effects and shocks are likely to be correlated with observed 
hardware characteristics xj because brand image (for example) could be affected by 
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hardware quality, and evolve over time as exposure to advertising increases.  The 
endogeneity of within group market share, sjt|g , arises by definition: it contains the 
dependent variable, jts .  Within group market share appears in the nested logit 
specification but not the simple logit.  Console price pjt is most likely positively 
correlated with the unobserved attributes because an improvement in brand image will 
increase consumer’s willingness to pay for consoles, which affects prices in the market.  
Finally, the endogeneity of game variety arises due to the interaction between hardware 
adoption and software provision: a positive shock in hardware demand increases the 
installed base the next period, which in turn leads to increased software provision at time 
t.  Therefore if ξj is an autocorrelated series, jtN  and jtξ  are positively correlated.  Note 
that unlike previous papers we explicitly account for the presence of autocorrelation in 
our GMM estimation procedure.15 
The solutions we propose for these endogeneity issues are as follows.  First, the 
observed hardware characteristics do not change within our single generation of consoles, 
and so we include console dummies to subsume the hardware characteristics.  To control 
for endogeneity of the within group market share, we cannot adopt Berry’s (1994) 
suggestion to use competitors’ hardware attributes as instruments.  These do not change 
over time in the sample, and these instruments add nothing to the estimation when the 
console dummies are included in the specification.  Since we do not have an obvious 
time-varying instrument available for within group share,16 we are not surprised that we 
                                                 
15 Clements and Ohashi (2005) test for and find autocorrelation, but do not use it to increase the efficiency 
of their estimation and apparently do not adjust their standard errors for its presence. 
16 The within group share from the Japanese market does not prove to be a good instrument. 
16 
find below that the nested logit maodel leads to poor results, and we simplify the model 
to simple logit. 
To control for endogeneity of console price, we use the retail console price in 
Japan collected from Nikkei News.  Prices in Japan are correlated with US prices because 
both depend on production costs (all consoles are manufactured at the same location).  
However, Japanese prices will not be correlated with unobserved console 
characteristics jtξ  in the US hardware equation if Japanese gamers have different tastes 
for games and systems.  An alternative data set we collected from Mediacreate17 on 
console sales in the Japanese market shows some evidence for differing tastes.  For 
example, unlike its strong performance in the US market, the sales of XBOX lag in the 
Japanese market, even with a similar price and game variety comparison to GameCube as 
in the US market.  The gaming trade press also mentions difference between the 
preferences of US and Japanese game players.18  In the end, however, no airtight case can 
be made a priori proving the Japanese price data are valid instruments, and we therefore 
will pay close attention to the results of overidentification tests to assess the performance 
of the instruments below.  
We also use the Japanese-US current exchange rate as an instrument for price.  
Since some of the consoles were manufactured in Japan, fluctuations in the exchange rate 
should affect retail prices in the US.19  
                                                 
17 Mediacreate collects Japanese video game market sales data.  It posts weekly sales reports of consoles.  
18 For example, conventional wisdom in the trade press holds that Japanese players tend to prefer more 
relational games, titles based around “cute” characters, good story lines, and fantasy-based games, whereas 
US players tend to prefer more realistic, action-oriented, violent games with exciting graphics and do not 
demand continuity in the story line between game editions.  See, for example, the article “Xbox Courts 
Japan” at JapanInc.com (http://www.japaninc.com/article.php?articleID=10). 
19 Clements and Ohashi (2005) used one year lagged exchange rates as instruments, arguing that consoles 
were introduced in Japan a year earlier than in the US.  We use the current exchange rate for two reasons. 
The sixth generation consoles did not see such a long lag between Japanese and US introductions. 
17 
The endogeneity of software variety is controlled by using the accumulated game 
variety in Japan (from Famitsu20). Japanese game variety should be correlated with US 
game variety, because (differences in tastes notwithstanding) many game titles are 
provided in both countries due to scale economies, given that the lion’s share of cost to 
produce a title is up front for development.  However, Japanese game variety should not 
be correlated with jtξ if demand shocks in Japan are uncorrelated with demand shocks in 
the US.21  In addition to the instruments above, we also use console age (the number of 
months since sales began) and square of age.  
Endogeneity in the Software Provision Equation 
The concern with endogeneity in the installed base, like that of game variety in 
the hardware adoption model, comes from the interaction of hardware adoption with the 
potential autocorrelation of jtη . If software provision is affected by 1jtη − , hardware 
adoption and therefore 1jts − will be affected, and hence the installed base in the next 
period, jtIB . Therefore, if jtη is autocorrelated with 1jtη − , endogeneity in tIB  arises. To 
control for the endogeneity issue in installed base, we use age and age squared, and also 
allow them to interact with console effect as instruments.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Furthermore, the relevant Yen cost at the time of sale from a Japanese wholesaler or factory to a US retailer 
is the opportunity (replacement) cost of the console, not the embedded production cost (which is a sunk 
cost at that point). Thus the current exchange rate appears to be the logical choice for an instrument. 
20 Famitsu is a weekly video game magazine covering details of the Japanese video game market. 
21 The reasoning is similar to that for using Japanese prices as instruments for US prices. The endogeneity 
of accumulated software is due to the correlation between game variety at period t and unobservable 
characteristics at period t-1. Similarly, unless the demand shocks of Japan and the US are correlated, 
Japanese software issuance will be affected by previous demand shocks in Japan but not current US 
demand shocks. 
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5. Estimation results 
In this section we present the GMM estimation of the hardware adoption and 
software provision model.  Results are presented in Tables 4 and 5.  We begin by 
examining the explanatory power of the instruments.  For each specification of Table 4, 
we calculate an F-statistic for each endogenous variable and an F-statistic for the joint 
(Anderson-Rubin) test from the first stage of regression. To conserve table space we 
show only the p-values for the joint test.  The statistics, regardless of test type, lead us to 
reject the hypothesis of weak instruments at the 1% level for all variables unless 
otherwise noted below.  We also calculate the statistics for the Anderson canonical 
correlations likelihood-ratio test for underidentification.22  The Anderson tests do not 
indicate any problem with the instruments, either.  Finally, since we have more 
instruments than instrumented variables, we can also make use of overidentification tests 
to assess the validity of the instruments.  We present the Hansen J statistics in the table.23  
More details are provided in the discussion below. 
5.1 Hardware Adoption: 
Table 4 presents several specifications of the estimation for the hardware adoption 
model.  As described earlier in the empirical model, instead of using total accumulated 
game variety in our estimation, we decompose the total game variety into two parts: the 
accumulation of software variety from the current and three months previous, and total 
software variety accumulated older than three months back.  Under this setup, we are able 
                                                 
22 The Anderson LR test determines if the excluded instruments are relevant.  Rejection of the null indicates 
that the model is identified.  
23 The Hansen J statistic for the GMM estimator is used for the Hansen-Sargan test of the overidentifying 
restrictions imposed.  The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments (i.e., 
uncorrelated with the error term) and that the instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated 
equation.  A rejection of the null hypothesis of the test casts doubt on the validity of the instruments. 
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to examine the impact of recent changes in accumulated variety and confirm that older 
titles play little role in console demand.   
Estimations H1-H3 are logit models.  In estimation H1, we control for console, 
year, and holiday effects but do not allow them to interact.  We found that in virtually any 
specification, console price enters non-linearly and we have added squared terms in price 
in all estimations (and squared Japanese price to the instrument set).  Although the tests 
for weak instruments and underidentification do not indicate any problems with the 
instruments, the Hansen-Sargan test rejects the hypothesis that the instruments are 
orthogonal to errors.  The coefficients of price, software variety, and within group market 
share are all significantly different from zero.  The estimated impact of price shows the 
model is misspecified:  demand slopes down in price only up to $158, about the average 
price in the sample.  However, demand slopes up in recent software variety, as expected.  
The variable “game titles (older)” is the difference between total game variety and the 
stock of recently issued titles (current month plus three previous months).  In H1, the 
coefficient for older titles is negative and significant.  While we do not expect that older 
titles affect demand much, it is hard to imagine that their presence would negatively 
impact demand, and we read this result (along with the evidence that the instruments are 
invalid) as evidence that a better specification is desired.   
In estimation H2, we allow the console and year effects to interact.  Adding these 
interactions is intended to remove any remaining endogeneity of the instrument set.  As 
described above, including the interaction term captures that consumers’ perception of 
the brand image may change over time due to marketing and product “buzz”.  Compared 
to H1, the Hansen J statistic is much improved (p = 0.30); there is no longer reason to 
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suspect the instruments are invalid.  The impact of price on demand is more sensibly 
estimated as well, being significant and negative for all but the four highest prices in the 
data.  Recent software variety is still significant and of the right sign.  The coefficient on 
older software variety is still negative and significant, however.  Therefore in 
specification H3 we include a squared term in older game titles to check for nonlinearity 
that may be resulting in a spuriously negative coefficient.  Once the squared term is 
included (and squared Japanese older titles added to the instrument set), the linear 
relationship between older titles and console demand disappears entirely, and the higher-
order effect is not significant at the 5% level.  This supports our hypothesis that the effect 
on demand of software is perishable.  The price coefficients are midway between those 
from the previous two estimations, and as in H2 the marginal effect of price on demand is 
negative for all but the four largest observations.  We interpret the magnitude of the price 
and software coefficients in a separate section below. 
In specification H4, we estimate the model as in H3, but treat the regressors as 
exogenous.  This allows us to see by how much the endogeneity affects the estimates.  
The same signs are present for all coefficients, although the magnitudes of the estimates 
are smaller in the OLS estimation and software variety is not significant.  Thus the 
instruments are able to identify a role for software variety in H3 that is obscured by 
endogeneity in H4.  A Hausman test rejects the equality of the coefficients in the two 
estimations (p = 0.028), supporting the notion that the suspected variables are indeed 
endogenous.   
As set forth in the empirical model above, we intended to use the nested logit 
model, to allow more flexible substitution patterns between consoles and the outside 
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option.  However, when within group share is added to the set of regressors, we do not 
get sensible results.  The coefficient on within group share is greater than its maximum 
sensible value of one, in all specifications analogous to H1-H3.  This may be a result of 
model misspecification, or it may be because we do not have good instruments for within 
group share.  We settle upon H3 as the best model to use to assess the relative importance 
of price and software variety and to conduct the counterfactual exercises.  
We tried other division points between older and newer titles (splitting at two and 
six months) as a robustness check.  However, only three month splits yielded reasonable 
signs for the coefficients.  For further robustness checking, we estimated a set of models 
in which we relax the assumption that households buy only one console each.  We allow 
the installed base to depreciate at an annual rate of 10%, 20%, and (as an extreme) 100%. 
The estimation results (not shown) reveal that the price and software variety coefficients 
are virtually unchanged compared to H3, indicating that the results are robust to the size 
of outside alternative market share.  
5.2 Software Supply 
Table 5 shows the estimation result of the software provision model.  In 
estimation S1, we control for year effect, console effect, the year-console interaction, and 
the holiday effect.  To control for the endogeneity of the installed base of consoles, we 
use age, square of age, and the interaction of the age variables with the console dummy 
variables as instruments. The results for S1 show that there is no suspicion that the 
instruments are weak or that the model is underidentified, and the J statistic does not lead 
us to reject the hypothesis that the instruments are valid.  Also, in this estimation we see 
that the coefficient on installed base is highly significant.  The log specification implies 
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that the coefficient of 2.5 is also the elasticity of software supply with respect to the 
installed base.  Thus a one percent increase in the installed base increases software 
provision for the console by 2.5%. 
However, console age is not included in S1.  We expect that even with a constant 
installed base, as time passes more software may be provided for a console, if for no 
other reason than that software development takes time.  Ideally we would like to identify 
the impact of the installed base due only to the network effects, independent of any 
effects due solely to the time the console has been on the market.  However, when we add 
age to the main equation (estimation S2), the installed base loses significance.  It is hard 
to conclude that age and not the installed base is the true determinant of supply, because 
the two are very highly correlated (ρ = 0.93).  We also estimated a specification without 
installed base but including age (results not shown).  Although we cannot directly 
compare such an OLS estimation to the GMM estimation S1, by a mean-square error 
criterion one would decide slightly in favor of S1 and the installed base variable. 
5.3 Joint Estimation 
The console demand and software supply equations can be jointly estimated to 
increase the precision of the estimates.  Two joint estimations are reported in Table 5.  
Specification J1 is the joint estimation of H3 and S1, and estimation J2 is the joint 
estimation of H3 and S2.  The coefficients are close to the single equation estimates. 
5.4 Interpretation of the Results and Strategic Implications 
With the estimation result for console demand, we can now examine the firm’s 
choice between increasing demand by lowering console price and by encouraging the 
growth of software variety.  We summarize the effects of this choice with elasticities:  
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elasticities of console demand share with respect to price,24 Pε , and software variety,25 
Sε .  The calculations, based on H3, are presented in Table 6, where we have averaged the 
monthly elasticities over the year. 
Except for 2002 for PlayStation2 and XBOX, all price elasticities are in the elastic 
region of demand, as the theory of pricing with market power suggests should be the case, 
and the hypothesis cannot be rejected for those two cases.  The results also reveal that 
price elasticity increases over the years 2002 – 2004, except for the last year for 
GameCube.  This finding is in contrast to Clements and Ohashi (2005), who found that 
elasticities generally decreased over time.  The difference is probably due to our more 
flexible specification for how price enters the share equation.  With only a linear term in 
price, elasticity will generally decrease as the price falls over time.  With higher order 
terms in price this need not happen, as we have found.  When elasticities rise over time, 
the effectiveness of reducing price to promote console sales appears to work better later 
in the console’s life cycle.  Comparing consoles, XBOX and PlayStation2 have similar 
elasticities, which are generally lower than those for GameCube in the early years.  
The elasticity of shares with respect to software variety does not show the same 
patterns as the price elasticities. The software variety elasticity is level over the years for 
PlayStation2 (around 1.0) and GameCube (around 0.5-0.6).  The software variety 
elasticity for XBOX rises slightly over the years, from 0.66 in 2002 to 0.84 in 2004.  
Since it became clear over time that XBOX’s better hardware was allowing developers 
                                                 
24 The own-price elasticity of demand share sjt with respect to price p at time t is p(βp1 + 2βp2p)(1 − sjt), 
where βp1 is the linear coefficient on price and βp2 is the coefficient on squared price.  
25 The elasticity of demand share sjt with respect to software variety v at time t is vβv (1 − sjt), where βv is 
the coefficient on recent software variety. 
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more leeway in designing desirable games, perhaps the rising εs reflects that games 
became increasingly valuable to Microsoft in spurring sales of consoles.   
The literature on two-sided markets, as well as analysts’ reports on the industry, 
indicates that the appropriate business model for the home video game market uses 
console sales as loss leader and software sales as the profit center. As a result, it is 
important for console manufacturers to know the trade-offs they face between lowering 
the hardware price and stimulating software production to increase the installed base of 
consoles.  The elasticities calculated from our demand model allow us to measure the 
relative effectiveness price reductions and software provision as two of console 
manufacturer’s strategies to attract console adoptions.  
To summarize the relative effectiveness of the two available business strategies 
(lowering console price and increasing software variety), and the possibilities for 
substitution between them, we calculate the ratio of the two elasticities.  This follows 
Gandal, Kende, and Rob (2000) and Clements and Ohashi (2005).  The relative 
effectiveness of the strategies is obtained from /S Pε ε− , which measures the percentage 
reduction in console price that has equivalent effect on demand as a one-percent increase 
in software variety.26  These results are also in Table 6. 
The results display that the average value across consoles of the ratio is 0.39:  a 
one percent increase in software variety is equivalent to a 0.39 percent price reduction.  
For each console the ratio falls over time, suggesting that it becomes relatively less 
effective to use software provision to attract console adoption over time.  PlayStation2 
has the highest relative effectiveness and GameCube the lowest.  Clements and Ohashi 
                                                 
26 The interpretation of the elasticity ratio follows from the definitions:  since εp = %Δs/%Δp and εS = 
%Δs/%ΔS, the ratio is −εS /εp = %Δp/%ΔS.   
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(2005) perform an analogous calculation for previous generations of the home video 
game market, and find that the elasticity ratio rose at first and then declined later in the 
product cycle.  Thus the product cycle may have sped up in the sixth generation, jumping 
quickly to the phase in which the ability the stimulate sales through software provision 
(relative to price reductions) declines over time. 
6. Is There An Applications Barrier to Entry? 
Can a console maker’s negotiating power with video game creators create an 
applications barrier to entry in the console market?  Barriers to entry based on software 
applications for a system received much discussion in the Microsoft antitrust case 
(Gilbert and Katz, 2001).  The government contended in the case that due to the high 
development costs of making software applications, programmers would not create 
applications for an operating system unless there were already large installed base of 
users.  In our context, the hardware console plays the role of the operating system.  If a 
console has few games created for it, the theory of indirect network effects predicts it will 
die quickly in the market place (as happened in the sixth generation with Dreamcast and 
in previous generations with the NEC TurboGrafx-16, the SNK NEO GEO, and the Atari 
Jaguar).  The question of antitrust concern is then whether a console maker’s ability to 
create games exclusively for its own system, either through self-provision or through 
negotiation with game developers (through exclusionary contracts), is strong enough to 
hinder entry by competitive systems or hasten exit of existing systems.  For this strategy 
to be successful, indirect network effects must be present:  the availability of software 
must increase hardware demand.   
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6.1 Do the Network Effects Differ for Exclusive Games? 
Predatory conduct as described above will be more successful if the indirect 
network effects are strong for exclusive software games.  Some video games can only be 
played on Xbox, for example, because the console producer (Microsoft, in this case) 
either created the game itself or negotiated an exclusive deal with a video game maker.  
PlayStation2, in particular, has over half of its games to itself (recall the shares of games 
that are unique to a console are in Table 2). 
To see how the impacts on console share from games uniquely available for a 
single system and games available for multiple systems, we re-estimate the hardware 
demand equation splitting software titles into unique and non-unique games (estimation 
H5 in Table 7).  It proved to be difficult to get sensible results from this estimation.  For 
example, when console by year effects are included, none of the software variables are 
significant.  Since none of the console by year coefficients are significant, we drop them.  
Also, there appear to be significant higher order effects for recent non-unique software 
variety but not for unique software, so we include a squared term for the former.  Finally, 
we note that the strength of our instruments27 is questionable according to the Anderson 
LR statistic and the first stage F statistic, and so the estimates may be biased.  Regardless, 
it is interesting to note in the estimation that recent variety of unique games has no 
significant effect on demand at all.  It is the non-unique games that are significantly and 
positively associated with console share.28  This appears to limit a console maker’s 
options to “starve” its competitors by putting many unique games on the market, if such 
games do not materially increase the installed base of the maker’s own console. 
                                                 
27 We split the Japanese software variety variables used as instruments the same way we did the US 
variables. 
28 The marginal effect of non-unique recent software variety is positive for all but the top quintile of variety 
in the data. 
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Another way to assess the feasibility of using the availability of games as a 
strategic weapon is to consider counterfactual scenarios in which no firm, or just the 
dominant firm, is able to offer unique games.29   
6.2 Counterfactual #1:  Full Quasi-Compatibility 
 
In our first counterfactual, no console firm or software designer is allowed to 
create games exclusively for a single platform.  Instead, any game is compatible with any 
system.  We call this quasi-compatibility because the physical game DVD made for 
PlayStation2, for example, does not work in the other consoles.  In the counterfactual, the 
software for the dominant console, PlayStation2, is also available in versions for XBOX 
and GameCube.  Thus we assign the software variety of PlayStation2 to the other 
consoles each month as well, in place of the actual values.  If the actual software variety 
in our data represents the equilibrium of the software supply model from section 3, then 
the XBOX and GameCube software markets will be “over-supplied”:  the software 
counts for these two consoles in the counterfactual will exceed the actual value.  
However, since putting out a version of a game for a second and third system is much 
less expensive than developing the original version, the counterfactual is not necessarily 
inconsistent with the structural supply model.  The additional supply from the 
PlayStation2 games is assumed to squeeze out supply of any other games.  In particular, 
we do not add XBOX and GameCube’s unique games to the PlayStation2 total).  Thus, 
all firms have symmetric software variety. 
                                                 
29 Understanding the demand side is only a first step toward fully assessing the competitive importance of 
applications barriers to entry.  Eventually we would like to add a model of strategic supply of consoles to 
the story, but that is probably beyond the scope of the current project. 
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As a cautionary note, recall that our estimation includes console, year, and 
interacted effects to capture the effect of brand image, advertising, and so forth.  We have 
no way of knowing how these effects would change in the counterfactual, and so we use 
the estimated values from H3.  We also have no structural model for the supply of 
consoles, and so we use the actual value of console prices.  The results, based on the 
coefficients estimated in H3, are in Figure 3.  The predicted market shares do not 
converge, as may have been expected a priori.  Thus the benefits from the indirect 
network effects by themselves for XBOX and GameCube are not strong enough to 
overcome PlayStation2’s market share dominance. 
6.3 Counterfactual #2:  Asymmetric Quasi-Compatibility 
In our second counterfactual scenario, we consider a market in which (perhaps 
due to conduct restrictions imposed by an antitrust authority on the dominant firm), as 
before, PlayStation2 games are quasi-compatible with the other systems, but that XBOX 
and GameCube are allowed to have unique games.  The software variety of PlayStation2 
is replaced by its software variety without exclusive software.  For both XBOX and 
GameCube, their software variety is replaced by PlayStation2’s non-unique software plus 
their own exclusive software.  Again using the coefficients from H3, we measure the 
predicted market share using the counterfactual values for the software variety variables.   
The results are in Figure 4.  As in the other counterfactual, the predicted market 
shares do not converge.  Except for a bit more convergence of XBOX and GameCube’s 
market shares, the general results are not too difference from the previous counterfactual.  
Again, the benefits from the indirect network effects by themselves for XBOX and 
GameCube are not strong enough to overcome PlayStation2’s market share dominance. 
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The results of this section show that there may not be much reason for concern 
regarding applications barriers to entry in this market.  Unique games do not appear to 
play as much a role in changing console markets shares as much as non-unique games do.  
Furthermore, the counterfactuals show that even if the amount of software available for 
each console were very different from the actual values, due to conduct restrictions or 
outlawing exclusionary game development contracts, PlayStation2 would still maintain 
its dominance.  Thus the role of exclusive games does not seem to be central to Sony’s 
dominance of the sixth generation video game market. 
7. Out-of-Sample Prediction 
In this final section, we investigate the applicability of structural econometric 
models of indirect network effects to new situations.  There is a growing set of empirical 
studies of markets with indirect network effects.  Are these case studies valuable for 
providing general insight into network markets, or do their conclusions apply only to the 
market and time period studied?  The hope offered by structural modeling is that 
fundamental parameters of the economic decision-making processes are estimated, so 
that one could apply the results to new situations and come up with accurate predictions 
of outcomes.  However, case studies are designed by their nature to answer a very 
specific question.  For example: what is the magnitude of the influence of indirect 
network effects on the demand for personal digital assistant (PDA) hardware from PDA 
software during the years 1999-2002 in the US, as measured from a particular data set 
and using a particular set of instruments (Nair, Chintagunta, and Dubé, 2004).  If the 
results of any one study extend no further than the bounds of the narrowly defined topic 
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at hand, then these case studies may be mainly of academic interest.30  However, if the 
case studies are to have something to say to antitrust officials and the marketing 
departments of technology companies, to name just two of many potentially interested 
parties, then we need to know how models fit to data from one market or time period do 
at out-of-sample prediction.   
One natural comparison for our study is to Clements and Ohashi (2005), who 
studied previous generations of video game systems.  Here we can take advantage of the 
fact that our data for PlayStation2 overlaps with their sample period for the first quarter 
of 2002.  The striking fact is that our estimated elasticities differ greatly from theirs.  
They report a share elasticity of -1.9 for price and 5.3 for software variety, whereas our 
figures from Table 6 are -1.0 and 1.0, respectively.  Thus their elasticity ratio of 2.8 for 
PlayStation2 is far from our ratio of 1.0, and would lead to quite different conclusions 
about the strategic options available to Sony to lower price vs. creating more software to 
stimulate console demand.  It is difficult to know what causes the differences.  We do not 
use the exact same instrument set, and (as noted above) found that adding non-linear 
terms in price improved the performance of our models.  However, we suspect the 
difference may stem more from the fact that PlayStation2 in 2002 appears at the end of 
their observation period and at the beginning of ours.  Thus their estimates may be 
influenced by average tendencies in the previous generations that changed substantially 
over time.  Similarly, we expect that if our results were extrapolated to the earlier years 
and systems in their data, our model would perform poorly.   
                                                 
30 …which is not to denigrate these studies in any way.  We are academics, of course, and find them very 
interesting in any event. 
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A second out-of-sample market to which we compare our results is the Japanese 
market for sixth generation gaming systems.  This estimation, H6 in Table 7, is analogous 
to H3 for the US market.31  The marginal effect of prices are not too dissimilar in the 
Japanese and US markets.  The price effects are equivalent in the two markets at a price 
of $140, a bit lower than the average price, with the Japanese price effect greater in 
magnitude for smaller prices and smaller in magnitude for higher prices.  Price elasticity 
of demand projected for the Japanese market from the US estimation would therefore be 
close to the actual for market prices around $140, and somewhat too large (in absolute 
value) for the higher prices actually observed.  The coefficient for recent software variety 
is very close to that estimated for the US market:  0.013 for Japan and 0.014 for the US.  
Thus software variety elasticity of demand projected for the Japanese market from the US 
estimation would be close to the actual.  Instruments of the same form appear to work as 
well for the Japanese market as for the US market:  the instruments pass the tests for 
strength and validity.  Thus, the out-of-sample prediction for the Japanese market using 
our estimations based on US data would apparently be close to the results using the actual 
Japanese market data.  Overall, then, it appears that out-of-sample prediction may work 
best moving laterally geographically within a single set of products, versus the poorer 
results obtained when comparing to previous or successive generations. 
8. Conclusion 
Our work in this paper raises two issues deserving further study.  We found little 
evidence for the possibility for a firm to erect an applications barrier to entry through 
                                                 
31 The one change we made was to replace the US-Japan exchange rate, used as a console cost instrument, 
with the Taiwan-Japan exchange rate.  Some of the consoles were manufactured in Taiwan during the 
sample period.  Otherwise the US prices and software varieties move from the main equation to the 
instrument set, and the Japanese prices and software varieties move to the main equation. 
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creating games exclusively for its own console (or through exclusionary contracts with 
software developers that result in the same outcome).  The hopeful note for purposes of 
public policy is that there appears to be no warrant for antitrust scrutiny in this market.  
The flip side of this result is that if intervention in the market were to take place for some 
reason, the policy instrument of outlawing exclusive software creation appears to be 
ineffective toward the goal of reducing market dominance by a firm.  The other less than 
sanguinary finding is that we find little generalizability of our results to previous markets, 
and vice versa.  Therefore, at this point we have no reason to expect that some day there 
will be a set of tried and true results for indirect network effect markets that can be 
applied to new markets absent detailed market data and estimation on a case-by-case 
basis.   
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TABLE 1:  Platform Characteristics 
 
Platform Introduction Month/Year Manufacturer 
Hardware 
Characteristics  2002 2003 2004 
   GPU (MHz) 
CPU 
(MHz) 
RAM 
(GB) % Console Sold 0.61 0.50 0.42 
Mean Console Price 233 187 160 
% Software variety 0.44 0.43 0.47 PlayStation2 OCT 2000 Sony 150 300 32 
% Console Sold 0.23 0.25 0.37 
Mean Console Price 237 187 157 
% Software variety 0.30 0.33 0.34 XBOX OCT 2001 Microsoft 233 733 64 
% Console Sold 0.17 0.26 0.21 
Mean Console Price 171 133 100 
% Software variety 0.26 0.24 0.19 GameCube OCT 2001 Nintendo 162 485 24 
Total Console Sales 
(Million Units) 14.1 12.9 10.9 
      Total Software Variety 502 539 511 
 Notes:  GPU is the speed of the graphics processing unit in megahertz.  MHz is the CPU clock speed in megahertz, and RAM is the 
memory size in gigabytes. 
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Table 2: Software Provision 
 
 
  2002 2003 2004 Platform Average 
PlayStation2 % variety provided exclusive to the platform 65 49 48 56 
 % variety provided by manufacturer 8.6 8.4 6.9 8.0 
XBOX % variety provided exclusive to the platform 34 32 37 34 
 % variety provided by manufacturer 7.9 9.8 4.6 7.4 
GameCube % variety provided exclusive to the platform 30 33 35 32 
 % variety provided by manufacturer 5.4 7.5 11.8 7.9 
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Table 3: Summary of Console Related Variables 
 
Platform  Market Share 
Within 
Group 
Share 
Price 
Game 
Titles 
(recent) 
Game Titles 
(old) 
Price in 
Japan 
Japan 
Game Titles 
(recent) 
Japan 
Game Titles 
(old) 
Age 
(mo.) 
US/Japan 
Exchange 
rate 
Mean 0.0074 0.52 175 77 474 199 178 843 34.5  
Max 0.0337 0.64 289 137 772 231 240 1616 51.0  
Min 0.0022 0.32 135 40 186 170 95 203 18.0  
PlayStation2 
s.d. 0.0069 0.09 35 28 185 26 56 468 12.2  
Mean 0.0042 0.28 176 55 216 186 22 84 21.5  
Max 0.0183 0.51 289 101 437 265 34 170 38.0  
Min 0.0008 0.19 135 25 20 145 13 0 5.0  
XBOX 
s.d. 0.0042 0.08 37 23 136 34 5 53 10.0  
Mean 0.0032 0.20 123 40 168 146 25 104 21.5  
Max 0.0171 0.36 193 80 321 191 46 217 38.0  
Min 0.0009 0.12 90 21 12 113 11 6 5.0  GameCube 
s.d. 0.0038 0.05 33 17 104 22 11 71 10.0  
Mean 0.0049 0.33 158 57 286 177 75 344 25.8 115.06 
Max 0.0337 0.64 289 137 772 265 240 1616 51.0 133.20 
Min 0.0008 0.12 90 21 12 113 11 0 5.0 103.18 
Overall 
s.d. 0.0054 0.16 43 28 198 34 77 436 11.6 7.33 
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Table 4:  Hardware Demand Estimations for Sixth Generation Game Consoles 
 
 H1 H2 H3 H4 (OLS) 
 Coefficient s.e Coefficient s.e Coefficient s.e Coefficient s.e 
Constant -1.845* 1.059 0.492 2.013 -1.917 1.692 -2.708 0.833 
Price -0.027*** 9.96E-03 -0.053** 0.017 -0.038*** 0.012 -0.020*** 6.06E-03 
Price, squared 4.29E-05* 2.40E-05 1.08E-04*** 3.73E-05 7.99E-05*** 2.72E-05 3.00E-05** 1.40E-05 
Game Titles 
(recent) 0.018*** 4.98E-03 0.0181*** 5.04E-03 0.014*** 3.93E-03 2.48E-03 1.78E-03 
Game Titles 
(old) -3.17E-03*** 1.04E-03 -3.33E-03** 1.61E-03 1.66E-03 2.78E-03 7.40E-04 1.71E-03 
 Game Titles 
(old), squared - - -4.48E-06* 2.49E-06   
Console Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES 
Interaction 
between Year 
and console  
NO YES YES YES 
Hansen J 
statistic  p-value = 0.0418 p-value = 0.3602 p-value = 0.1480 - 
Anderson LR 
statistic p-value = 0.0007 p-value = 0.0003 p-value = 0.0000 - 
Anderson-
Rubin F stat. p-value = 0.0000 p-value = 0.0000 p-value = 0.0000 - 
* = significant at 10% level.  ** =  significant at 5% level.  *** = significant at 1% level. 
Notes:    N = 102.  The dependent variable is the log share of households purchasing a particular console brand in a given month.  Game Titles (recent) is the 
software variety accumulated during the current month and the three previous months.  Anderson LR statistic is the Anderson canonical correlation likelihood 
ratio statistic for underidentification.  Rejection of the null implies that the model is not underidentified (does not suffer from weak instruments). 
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Table 5:  Software Supply and Joint Estimations for Sixth Generation Video Game Systems 
 S1 S2 J1 J2 
 Coefficient s.e Coefficient s.e Coefficient s.e Coefficient s.e 
Constant 
(Hardware )     -2.65970 2.04725 -2.683 1.828 
Price - - -0.036*** 0.0134 -.034*** 0.012 
Price, squared - - 0.768E-04** 0.309E-04 7.172E-05** 2.788E-05 
Game Titles 
(recent) - - 0.019*** 0.573E-02 .016*** 5.350E-03 
Game Titles (old) - - 0.172E-02 0.384E-02 2.305E-03 3.186E-03 
 Game Titles 
(old), squared - - -.397E-05 .342E-05 -4.820E-06* 2.839E-06 
Constant 
(Software) 38.352*** 9.111 -11.118 13.114 -34.127*** 8.493 -3.703 9.461 
Installed Base 
(log) 2.535*** 0.564 0.742 0.842 2.272*** .526 0.256 0.607 
Hardware Age - 0.082*** 0.029 - 0.101*** 0.022 
Console Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES 
Interaction 
between Year 
and Console 
YES YES YES YES 
Hansen J statistic  p-value = 0.3650 p-value = 0.9914 p-value = 0.1105 p-value = 0.5274 
Anderson LR 
statistic p-value = 0.0000 p-value = 0.0000 - - 
Anderson-Rubin 
F stat. p-value = 0.0001 p-value = 0.9694 - - 
* = significant at 10% level.  ** =  significant at 5% level.  *** = significant at 1% level. 
Notes:  N = 102.  The dependent variable in S1 and S2 is the log number of software titles provided for a particular console brand in a given month.  See also 
notes to previous table. 
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Table 6: Demand Share Elasticities 
 
Platform Share elasticity 2002 2003 2004 Average 
-0.987 -1.804*** -2.175*** -1.799*** Price ( )pε  (0.695) (0.665) (0.697) (0.665) 
1.010*** 1.015*** 1.143*** 1.059*** Game variety ( )sε  (0.281) (0.283) (0.319) (0.295) PS2 
S P/ε ε−  1.023 0.563 0.525 0.589 
-0.851 -1.796*** -2.195*** -1.789*** Price ( )pε  (0.718) (0.667) (0.699) (0.666) 
0.662*** 0.776*** 0.839*** 0.765*** Game variety ( )sε  (0.185) (0.216) (0.234) (0.213) XBOX 
S P/ε ε−  0.778 0.432 0.382 0.427 
-2.065*** -2.285*** -2.159*** -2.289*** Price ( )pε  (0.687) (0.707) (0.659) (0.707) 
0.564*** 0.593*** 0.500*** 0.552*** Game variety ( )sε  (0.157) (0.165) (0.139) (0.154) GameCube 
S P/ε ε−  0.273 0.260 0.232 0.241 
-2.057*** Price ( )pε  (0.685) 
0.792*** Game variety ( )sε  (0.221) Overall Average 
S P/ε ε−  0.385 
Note: Elasticities and standard errors calculated based on estimation H3.  Asymptotic standard errors (in parentheses) calculated via the delta method. 
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Table 7:  Further Hardware Demand Estimations for Sixth Generation 
Game Consoles 
 
 H5 H6  (Japanese Market) 
 Coefficient s.e Coefficient s.e 
Constant -3.777 2.524 1.807 2.994 
Price -0.025* 0.013 -0.059* 0.031 
Price, squared 4.15E-05 3.16E-05 1.53E-04 8.69E-05 
Game Titles (recent) - 0.013 6.45E-03 
Unique Game Titles (recent) 2.604E-03 .050 - 
Unique Game Titles (recent), 
squared -1.72E-03** 8.55E-04 - 
Non-Unique Game Titles 
(recent) 0.160** 0.065 - 
Game Titles (old) -4.18E-03 2.62E-03 -8.97E-03 3.23E-03 
 Game Titles (old), squared - 3.40E-06 1.33E-06 
Console Effects YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES 
Interaction between Year and 
Firm NO YES 
Hansen J statistic  p-value = 0.1566 p-value = 0.1257 
Anderson LR statistic p-value = 0.3807 p-value = 0.0000 
Anderson-Rubin F stat. p-value = 0.0000 p-value = 0.0019 
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Figure 1:  Interactions in the Video Game Industry 
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Figure 2:  Market Sales of Video Game Consoles 
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Figure 3:  Results of Counterfactual #1 – Full Quasi-compatibility 
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Figure 4:  Results of Counterfactual #2 – Asymmetric Quasi-compatibility 
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